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Introduction 
Late in 1938 the German chemists O. Hahn and F. Strassmann discovered 
the fission of the uranium nucleus. Soon thereafter the German physicist L. 
Meitner and her Austrian colleague O. Frisch showed that in this reaction a 
large amount of energy is released.' Aware of the possible consequences2 
the Dutch government purchased in the summer of 1939 ten tons of 
'Yellowcake' (the trade name of partly refined uranium oxide) from Union 
Miniere in Belgium.3 This purchase became an important asset when after 
the Second World War the Dutch government faced the task of breathing 
new life into the pursuit of science. As regards nuclear science, it was soon 
realized that it would be impossible for the Netherlands to build a nuclear 
reactor on its own. To do so was not technically, and especially not 
fmancially, feasible for such a small country: 'We must learn to think on an 
entirely different scale from the Dutch scale, on a west European scale'.4 
Efforts to bring about joint working arrangements with the Americans in this 
sphere were severely hampered by the United States' policy of mono-
polisation and of keeping secret the information acquired in the field of 
nuclear energy. 
I R. Jungk, Licht van duizend zonnen [translatedfrom: Helier aus tausend Sonnen; also 
translated in: Brighter than a thousand suns} (Amsterdam: Scheltens and Giltay, 1957), pp. 
74-75. 
'In the summer of 1939 the Dutch Prime Minister H. Colijn was informed of the latest 
developments on nuclear fission by the Duch Professor W.J. de Haas from the University 
of Leiden. The possible military consequences were also emphasized. Central Archives 
Ministry of Defence (hereafter CAMD), The Hague, Ministry of War, LlTI P 34 25/10/45, 
W.J. de Haas to Prince Bernhard, Enclosure: 'Voorgeschiedenis van den aankoop van 
Uraanoxyde zouten', 3 Sept. 1945. 
J H.M. Hirschfeld, Herinneringen uit de bezettingstijd (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1960), p. 
206; G. Dean, Report on the atom (New York: Knopf, 1953), p. 267; H.B.G. Casimir, Het 
toeval van de werkelijkheid Een halve eeuw natuurkunde [translated from: Haphazard 
Reality. Half a Century of Science} (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1983), p. 203; H. Ramaer, De 
dans om het nucleaire kalf(Rotterdam: Uitgeverij RAM, 1974), pp. 15-19; J.A. Goedkoop, 
'Geel pigment en zwaar water', Energiespectrum 14(1990)I(January), pp. 14-20; CAMD, 
Chef Technische Staf KL 1946-1949, Box I, File "Atoomenergie 1946", No. 60204-0-101 
04/02/46, Meijnen to Sizoo, 4 Feb. 1946. 
4 Foundation for Fundamental Research on Matter (hereafter FOM by its Dutch 
acronym», Utrecht, Minutes Governing Council FOM, 1946-51, Minutes of the meeting of 
the Governing Council FOM, 2 April 1949. 
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Eventually the Dutch search for a partner resulted in a working 
relationship with Norway started in 1951 with the Joint Establishment for 
Nuclear Energy Research (JENER), in which Great Britain would also come 
to play an important role. The Norwegians had experienced the same 
problems with American policy as the Dutch. They had also come to the 
conclusion that co-operation was necessary. The ability of the two countries 
to get along together so well in the nuclear field arose from their capacity 
to complement each other. By 1950 the Norwegians had already laid the 
foundations of a reactor at Kjeller near Oslo. Furthermore the essential heavy 
water,S used as a moderator in a nuclear reactor,6 was produced in Rjukan. 
However, the Norwegians lacked one essential resource: uranium. Uranium 
ore was being mined near Evje in the Setesdal, but it was of poor quality 
and insufficient in quantity. The Netherlands by way of contrast possessed 
in their Yellowcake about seven tons of uranium and contributed it to the 
joint venture. Furthermore, the Netherlands was able to bring in considerable 
experience in nuclear research. A Dutch multinational, Philips in Eindhoven, 
had been active in nuclear research even before the Second World War.7 In 
short, it was possible for the two small countries to enter into a joint 
working relationship based on reciprocity. This relationship would, however, 
have to compete against a policy being pursued by the United States that 
dominated the international atomic energy scene. 
This study describes the co-operation between the Netherlands and 
Norway in the sphere of the peaceful use of nuclear energy: from the first, 
5 Most of the hydrogen atoms in water only have a proton as nucleus. One in 5,500 also 
contain a neutron and are thus nucleii of the isotope hydrogen-2 or deuterium (D). By 
electrolysis, among other methods, they can be concentrated to produce in the end virtually 
pure D20 or heavy water. 
• A moderator is a material which is used in nuclear reactors to slow down the neutrons 
released by uranium fission, thus increasing their chance to induce fission of another 
uranium nucleus and perpetuate the chain reaction. This is achieved by having the neutrons 
bump repeatedly into the atomic nucleii ofthe moderator. The neutrons thus slowed down 
are called thermal neutrons. A good moderator must have a low mass number and a low rate 
of neutron absorption. Examples are heavy water, graphite, beryllium and ordinary water, 
the latter however having significant neutron absorption. 
7 J.H. de Boer, Van het een /comt het ander, Afscheidscollege gehouden op 26 juni 1969 
(Delft: Waltrnan, 1969), pp. 6-7; Philips Company Archives, Overzicht activiteiten Philips 
in de jaren dertig en veertig, undated, pp. 1-3; Dean, Report on the atom, p. 269; Harry S. 
Truman Library (hereafter HSTL), Independence, Missouri, Alphabetical File, Box 17, File: 
War report - Intelligence review, 13 feb. 1947, pp. 69-71. 
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'love at fIrst sight', contact between H.A. Kramers and Gunnar Randers in 
1950, via two JENER contracts to the liquidation of JENER in 1959.8 
'Love at first sight' 
In January 1950 the eminent Dutch physicist and driving force behind post-
war Dutch research in nuclear physics, H.A. Kramers, visited Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden to follow up contacts that had been made on 10 
November 1949 in Amsterdam on the inauguration of the fIrst Dutch 
cyclotron.9 The possibility of joint working arrangements with Denmark and 
Sweden came to nothing for various reasons. With Norway the outcome was 
completely different. 
Kramers was received in Oslo by Gunnar Randers. Randers had gone 
all out to build a nuclear reactor in Norway and construction was now 
underway at Kjeller, just outside Oslo. As mentioned, the Norwegians still 
lacked the uranium. The Norwegians were forced to mine uranium from very 
poor ores near Evje. Not quite confIdent in their own mining, in 1948 they 
had knocked on the door of the British for supplies of uranium, \0 but had 
been informed that the British did not want to supply uranium metal because 
' ... our own production programme is designed in such a way that we have 
very little spare capacity and must be cautious about accepting even a small 
additional amount of work'.l1 The British source was thus cut off. 
The response from the French was to ask for the establishment of a 
formal co-operation. This was no surprise. Norway and France were 
• The co-operation between Norway, the Netherlands and Great Britain is also (partly) 
described in: l.A. Goedkoop, Geschiedenis van de Noors-Nederlandse samenwerking op het 
gebied van de kernenergie (The Hague: Reactor Centre Netherlands, Mededelingen No. 30, 
1967); A. Forland, Norsk Atomenergipolitikk, 1945-1951 (Bergen: Universitet i Bergen 
[Dissertation], 1985); A. Forland, 'Pa leiting etter uran. Institutt for atomenergi og 
internasjonalt samarbeit 1945-51', Forsvarsstudier 3(1987); A. Forland, 'Atomer for krig 
eller fred? Etableringa av Institutt for Atomenergi 1945-48', Forsvarsstudier 2(1988). 
• For a report on Kramers' trip to Scandinavia, see: FOM, Minutes Governing Council 
FOM, 1946-51, Minutes of the meeting of the Governing Council FOM, II Feb. 1950, pp. 
1-2. 
10 Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), London, AB6/360, Randers to Cockcroft, 31 
March 1948; Cooperation with Norway, by Cockcroft, 3 Feb. 1948; Norwegian request for 
uranium metal, by Perrin, 17 March 1948. 
11 Ibid., Perrin to Randers, 30 Dec. 1948. 
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collaborating closely throughout the 1940's on the peaceful use of atomic 
energy. Doctorate students were sent to France to learn from French nuclear 
science. One of them, Einar Sealand, returned to Norway to become the 
director of the chemical department at Kjeller. Others worked for shorter 
stages in French laboratories. Odd Dahl, who would construct the first 
Kjeller reactor, likewise went to France to study the first French nuclear 
reactor. France assisted the Norwegians with their project because the French 
needed Norwegian heavy water for the construction of the first French piles. 
The Norwegians were very reluctant to enter into an agreement with the 
French. '2 The French option was eventually abandoned mainly for political 
reasons. The scientific leader of the French Commissariat it I'Energie 
Atomique (CEA), Frederic Joliot-Curie, was renowned for his left-wing 
sympathies and the Norwegians did not want to risk their good relations with 
the United States on this account 13 The negotiations between the Nor-
wegians and French had reached a stalemate when Kramers appeared on the 
stage. 
The message from Kramers that the Netherlands possessed a 
substantial quantity of uranium oxide came to Randers 'like a lifebuoy'. 
Randers grasped the proposal of co-operation with both hands. The 
Norwegian central organisation for research, the Norges Teknisk Natur-
vitskaplege Forskingsrad (NTNF), received a generous donation for the 
reactor from the Norwegian Minister of Defence, Jens Chr. Hauge. Randers 
thought the Norwegians might have enough of their own uranium available 
within one to two years, but this estimate was seriously doubted by other 
physicists. Moreover, major problems were anticipated in purifying the 
uranium. In short, Kramers arrived in Norway at a strategically important 
moment He recognised the Norwegians' eagerness to get hold of uranium 
and proposed that Dutch uranium oxide be used to fuel the Norwegian 
nuclear reactor. During the course of this meeting the broad outline of a joint 
working relationship was agreed upon. 
12 A. Forland, Norsk Alomenergipolilik/c, 1945-1951, pp. 127-146. 
13 The United States held the view that' ... Prof. and Mme Joliot-Curie are active and 
ardent communists and are strongly anti-United States in their sympathies ... Their 
communist leanings are of long standing and have been fostered by close family associations 
with two extreme leftists, Profs. Paul Langevin and Jean Perrin, both now dead. This 
association formed the nucleus of a clique of communist physicists which, unfortunately, had 
been dominant in French scientific circles'. HSTL, Naval Aide Files, Alphabetical File, Box 
19, War Department - Intelligence Review, June 1947, 26 June 1947, p. 57. 
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On 4, 5 and 6 March 1950 an 'international committee' of Nor-
wegians and Dutch met in Leiden to discuss bilateral co-operation. C.J. 
Bakker, director of the Amsterdam cyclotron, and lM.W. Milatz, treasurer 
of the Foundation for Fundamental Research on Matter (hereafter FOM by 
its Dutch acronym), the central organisation engaged in nuclear physics 
research in the Netherlands, took part in the discussions on the Dutch side, 
while Kramers had a more advisory role. Randers was present on the 
Norwegian side. The starting points that Kramers and Randers had discussed 
in January 1950 were worked out in more detail. 14 
The preamble to the agreement stressed the economies that could be 
achieved in the sphere of nuclear energy by small countries working 
together. Both countries wanted in this way to gain access to a nuclear 
reactor to carry out scientific research. It was hoped that the knowledge 
obtained would make possible a joint reactor producing significant power to 
be built at a later date. NTNF and FOM were to appoint a Joint Commission 
for co-operation whose task was to make the nuclear reactor in Kjeller ready 
for operation as quickly as possible and to set up and organise scientific and 
technical research. The committee was to be made up of six members and 
six deputy members appointed on a fifty-fifty basis. The duties of chairman 
would be alternately shared. The director on the other hand would be a 
Norwegian, to be appointed by the Joint Commmission. The normal running 
costs would be met by NTNF; FOM would contribute to these costs and 
provide technical equipment. FOM was also to supply no more than five tons 
of uranium raw material. Through the stipulation that the instruments and 
raw materials remained the property of those who had contributed them, the 
Netherlands kept possession of its uranium raw material. Thus the Nether-
lands retained the right of ownership which could be claimed should the 
need arise. Broad agreement was reached between the two delegations. Only 
one problem remained unresolved: The Dutch uranium oxide needed to be 
purified within the shortest time possible, because unpurified uranium could 
not be used in the Norwegian reactor. 
14 FOM, Minutes Governing Council FOM, 1946-51, Minutes of the meeting of the 
Governing Council FOM, 25 March 1950, pp. 1-4. 
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Refining the uranium oxide 
For a nuclear reactor to be maintained in a critical state [that is to say a state 
where it can sustain a chain reaction] with as little natural uranium as 
possible, all other neutron absorbing materials must be avoided. This is the 
reason one cannot use ordinary water as the moderator. Criticality is possible 
with graphite as moderator provided one has available at least ten tons of 
uranium; otherwise it is only possible with heavy water, which shows very 
little absorption. Norway could provide the heavy water, but then the Dutch 
uranium oxide needed to be purified to remove all undesirable components. 
Fortunately, oxygen scarcely absorbs neutrons so that the purification goal 
could be achieved with pure uranium oxide, rather than metallic uranium, 
something which neither the Netherlands nor Norway was anywhere near 
being able to manufacture at that time. Thus FOM was confronted with the 
question of where the unrefined raw material was to be converted into pure 
oxide for the reactor in Kjeller. There were two options: in the Netherlands 
or in France. I' 
The French option was the least desirable. The reason why was the 
same as the considerations of the Norwegians: American opposition and 
Joliot-Curie's 'communism'. Alongside political considerations, fmancial 
considerations also played a part. The factory ofVondelingenplaat Chemical 
Products PLC, near Rotterdam, had made an offer to refme the uranium for 
fifty thousand guilders,16 thirty thousand guilders less than the price that the 
French were askingY Finally, the members of the Dutch Joint Commission 
thought it better to keep everything in their own hands: ' ... then we gain 
essential experience which is invaluable. Moreover, there is always the risk, 
ifit were done in France, that our hexa-oxide, a codenarne for 'Yellowcake', 
might be affected by an export ban'. 
However, increasingly it became clear that even using pure uranium 
oxide would have drawbacks. Once the reactor would have been brought to 
a critical state, with a constant average number of neutrons circulating inside 
it, so that the neutron density, number of neutrons per cubic metre, and the 
neutron flux, the number of neutrons which would fly through an imaginary 
IS Ibid., Minutes of the meeting of the Governing Council FOM, 25 May 1950, p. 8. 
'6 FOM, Records Beekman, Netherlands Joint Commission delegation, Kernreactor-II, 
Factory ofVondelingenplaat Chemical Products PLC to Woltjer, 23 May 1950. 
17 Ibid., Minutes of the meeting of the Joint Commission-Netherlands, 8 June 1950, p. 
6. 
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square metre per second, were both constant, the next question to consider 
would be the size of these numbers. To produce radioactive isotopes and to 
conduct physics experiments the neutron flux should be as high as possible. 
But this quantity is limited by the amount of heat which can be carried away 
per second from the reactor, the thermal capacity, usually expressed in 
kilowatts. Now for a reactor like that at Kjeller, with the uranium fuel 
compacted in rods, the thermal capacity would, apart from the size of the 
heat exchanger, the capacity of the circulation pump and the outside 
temperature, be determined by the temperature the fissionable material could 
sustain. Hence it would depend on both the diameter of the fuel rods and on 
their thermal conductance. 
What Kramers had begun to fear now (Randers was rather more 
optimistic) was that even after the purified uranium oxide had been 
compacted as much as possible by compression, the rods would still be so 
thick and the heat conduction so poor that the reactor would ouly be able to 
produce approximately ten kilowatts. Kramers thought this amount 
inadequate and this is why he would much rather have metal uranium fuel 
rods. During a meeting at the British Foreign Office on 25 July 1950 he 
mentioned that the Netherlands wanted the reactor to produce one to two 
hundred kilowatts, which would not be possible with uranium oxide. IS 
During this visit J.D. Cockcroft, the scientific leader of the British nuclear 
progranune, had already indicated that the British were able to make the 
metal. The process was secret, so that it could not be produced under licence 
in the Netherlands. With this information in the backs of their minds the 
Dutch delegation of the Joint Commission decided, at its own meeting, to 
enquire into the possibility of obtaining uranium metal rods from Great Bri-
tain. 19 
18 Archives Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMFA), The Hague, London Embassy, Secret 
Archive, 1955-64, Box 36, 813.33, Nederland-Noorwegen Atoomenergie, Gevers to Boon, 
25 July 1950; and PRO, AB6/512, Records of Conversation by Roger Makins, 25 July 1950. 
"FOM, Records Beekman, Netherlands Joint Commission delegation, Kernreactor-II, 
. Minutes of the meeting of the Netherlands Joint Commission delegation, 2 Aug. 1950, p. 
3. 
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Uranium metal rods from Great Britain for JENER 
Kramers took it upon himself to implement the decision. On 4 August 1950 
he asked Cockcroft to supply more technical details. Kramers proposed to 
come to Harwell, the British nuclear research centre, with Randers to discuss· 
the matter further.20 Cockcroft, however, demanded from Kramers that the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Mfairs first' .. make an enquiry from our Foreign 
Office as to whether they would be able to turn your uranium oxide into 
metal'. In short, both ministries had to give their authorisation.21 
After the Norwegian-Dutch joint venture was approved in principle 
by the Dutch Council of Ministers on 27 December 1950,22 Kramers played 
for high stakes by asking for more than was necessary: 'About three tons 
would suffice, but it might be useful to buy a good deal more, eventually all 
we can get, for the oxide available. Randers urges us strongly to buy all we 
can' .23 It became apparent later that Randers really meant it when he 
offered to pay any costs in excess of what the Netherlands could afford: 'By 
non-payment Norway could give heavy water in exchange for the metal'.24 
In reply to Kramers' earlier questions,2S Cockcroft noted that the 
British '... should be able to deliver the uranium metal rods as soon as 
arrangements could be made to ship them provided that at the same time you 
could arrange to ship the oxide to us'. 26 An initial inspection of the metal 
rods led Cockcroft to conclude that they were perfectly suitable for the 
reactor in Kjeller. According to informal information given by the Ameri-
cans three tons of uranium metal would be required for the reactor in 
20 PRO, AB61512, Kramers to Cockcroft, 4 Aug. 1950. 
21 Ibid. and AMFA, London Embassy, Secret Archive, 1955-64, Box 36, 8\3.33, 
Nederland-Noorwegen Atoomenergie, Cockcroft to Kramers, 11 Aug. 1950. 
22 Algemeen Rijksarchief (=General National Archive), Second Section (hereafter ARA-
11), The Hague, 2.02.05, Archives Cabinet Council, Index no. 394, Meeting Cabinet Council, 
27 Dec. 1950. 
23 PRO, AB6/512, Kramers to Cockcroft, 8 Jan. 1951. 
24 FOM, Records Beekman, Netherlands Joint Commission delegation, Kemreactor 
1,11,111, Blanco Map and Minutes Reactor Committee, 1950-52, Minutes of the discussions 
of the Netherlands Joint Commission delegation with Dr. G. Randers, 23 Feb. 1951, p. 3. 
25 PRO, AB6/512, Kramers to Cockcroft, 28 Nov. 1950. 
26 Ibid., Cockcroft to Kramers, 4 Dec. 1950. 
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Kjeller. After some uncertainty about what was the right amount,27 the 
price per thousand kilos of metal was fixed at 7,540 English pounds 
including packing. The metal would be made available as soon as the Dutch 
'Yellowcake' was ready for delivery.28 
After initially asking for three and a half tons, Kramers soon reduced 
his request to no more than three tons of uranium metal: 'We now find, that 
the reactor tank will not even hold three tons' .29 Of course Cockcroft could 
not have any objections to Kramers' request and agreed to supply three tons 
of uranium metal. Somewhat surprised he added: '1 presume that you have 
agreed on this with the Norwegians'.3o Kramers was able to reassure him 
on this point.31 Financial problems probably lay at the root of this remark-
able step on Kramers' part. By exchanging less with the British the 
additional payment would be lower. Thus the Dutch gained more financial 
elbow room. 
Once financing had been arranged on the Dutch side, the fmal phase 
of the deal between the Netherlands and Great Britain to exchange oxide and 
metal could be set in motion. The small countries were eager to proceed, for 
research at Kjeller could not proceed without the British uranium metal. But 
first the British wanted to analyse the uranium ore before the shipment left 
the Netherlands. Results of the analysis received on 8 May 1951 showed that 
the Dutch oxide ', .. obtained a figure of 65% metal approximately'. The 
British were prepared to exchange 103 (50 kilogram) containers of the Dutch 
ore for three metric tons of British uranium metal rods. Upon receipt of the 
Dutch uranium ore, the British material would be shipped straight to 
Norway.32 The Dutch oxide was despatched to Britain on 25 May 195133 
and after its arrival a message was sent to Randers on 12 June 1951 telling 
him that the metal was on its way to Norway.34 On 22 June 1951 Randers 
27 Ibid., Kramers to Cockcroft, 10 Jan. 195 I and Cockcroft to Kramers, 12 Jan. 1951. 
21 Ibid., Cockcroft to Kramers, 4 Jan. 1951. 
" Ibid., Kramers to Cockcroft, 25 April 1951. 
]0 Ibid., Cockcroft to Kramers, 27 April 1951. 
31 Ibid., Kramers to Cockcroft, 8 May 1951. 
31 Ibid., Stewart to Kramers, 8 May 1951. 
33 PRO, AB6/360, Randers to Cockcroft, 6 June 1951. 
34 PRO, AB6I512, Amold to Randers, 12 June 1951. 
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informed Cockcroft that the material had arrived, in 137 boxes of which five 
or six were broken.3s 
JENER takes off 
The problem of obtaining uranium in suitable form for the reactor at Kjeller 
had been resolved for the time being. Formal negotiations on Norwegian-
Dutch co-operation could now take place. Following the earlier signing by 
Alf Ihlen, the director of N1NF, the Norwegian-Dutch contract was at last 
also signed by the Dutch in the meeting of the Dutch members of the Joint 
Commission on 15 March 1951.36 On 12, 13 and 14 April 1951 a Dutch 
delegation from FOM visited Oslo to meet representatives of N1NF to 
discuss arrangements for their joint venture.37 
The Joint Commission meeting of 12 April 1951 was mainly taken 
up with administrative matters.38 Present on behalf of the Netherlands were 
members Krarners, Bakker and Milatz; observers W.J: Beekrnan (on behalf 
of FOM and moreover the Dutch secretary) and IH. Bannier (secretary of 
the executive committee of the organisation for Pure Scientific Research 
(ZWO), through which FOM was financed). Present on behalf of Norway 
were members Svein Rosseland (University of Oslo), Odd Dahl (Christian 
Michelsens Institute) and Nicolai Stephansen (Norsk Hydro); observer Robert 
Major on behalf ofNlNF. Gunnar Randers served as Norwegian Secretary. 
Alf Ihlen, who chaired the meeting provisionally until a chairman could be 
elected, emphasized the importance of Norwegian-Dutch co-operation in the 
field of nuclear physics; he saw the project as a first step towards West 
European integration in this field. Krarners was able to present the signed 
35 Ibid. and AB6/360, Randers to Cockcroft, 22 June 1951. 
3. FOM, Records Beekman, Netherlands Joint Commission delegation, Kemreactor-
I,II,III, B1anco map and Minutes Reactor Committee, 1950-52, Minutes ofthe sixth meeting 
of the Netherlands Joint Commission delegation, 15 March 1951, p. 5 . 
. " Archives Ministry of Education and Science (hereafter AMES), Zoetermeer, Hoger 
Onderwijs' en Wetenschappen (hereafter HOW), Index no. 141, Behandeling van 
aangelegenheden met betrekking tot de Stichting FOM, Note FOM regarding 'Samenwerking 
tussen Noorwegen en Nederland op het gebied van atoomenergie', undated; Bannier to 
Rutten, 18 April 1951. 
"FOM, Minutes Joint Commission, 1951-54, Minutes of the first meeting of the Joint 
Commission, 12 April 1951. 
f3 
contract, which now carried, alongside Ihlen's signature the signatures of 
himself, H.R. Woltjer (from the Governing Council of FOM) and Milatz. 
On 13 April, between the two meetings of the Joint Commission, the 
men visited KjelJer, where the laboratories and the construction of the 
nuclear reactor were almost completed. The reactor was to contain three tons 
of uranium and seven tons of heavy water as moderator. The heavy water 
was to be cooled by circulating it through a heat exchanger. 
In the second meeting of the Joint Commission more substantive 
matters came up for discussion.39 The Dutch had been impressed by the 
achievements of the Norwegians. The Norwegians, despite the uncertainty 
which had prevailed over the cooperative relationship for a long time, were 
proceeding in top gear: 'Many millions of crowns had been allocated before 
it had become completely certain that the 'material' [uranium raw material] 
would be available'. The Norwegians also expressed satisfaction about the 
achievement of the agreement with the Netherlands. Amazement was 
expressed at ' ... Dutch preparedness, abandoning all chauvinism, to allow all 
the work to be carried out in Norway'. The name for the joint project was 
agreed: Joint Establishment for Nuclear Energy Research (JENER). The 
work to be carried out at KjelJer was, in the first instance, to be concerned 
with production of radioactive isotopes, practical application of those 
isotopes, research on neutrons, research on metals and other materials using 
the reactor, and study of the possible application of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes. By inviting research workers from other countries the 
sponsors hoped to initiate a closer cooperation between the West European 
countries in the field of nuclear energy. 
Svein Rosseland, Odd Dahl, the man who had designed the reactor, 
and Nicolai Stephanson were appointed as members of the Joint Commission 
on behalf of Norway. Kramers (chairman of FOM), Bakker (director of the 
Dutch cyclotron) and Milatz (treasurer of FOM) were appointed on behalf 
of the Netherlands. Rosseland was elected chairman, Kramers as deputy 
chairman, and Randers as director of the joint venture. The director's salary 
was to be paid on a fifty-fifty basis. The financial contribution from the 
Norwegians was budgeted at 885,000 Norwegian crowns for 1951-1952 and 
the Dutch contribution at 700,000.40 By then the greater part of the Dutch 
contribution had already been spent on the conversion of the uranium. 
Finally, a press release was drawn up to officially publicise the Norwegian-
,. Ibid., Minutes of the second meeting of the Joint Commission, 14 April 1951. 
•• lbeexchange rate in 1951 was two Norwegian crowns for one Dutch Guilder. 
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Dutch joint venture. It was also decided to inform foreign governments 
through the official channels <if the coming about of the Norwegian-Dutch 
agreement. For the Dutch this meant the governments of the United States 
and Great Britain. The Dutch ambassador in Oslo immediately consulted the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to produce a press statement in 
English which was made public on 15 April 1951.41 The British42 and the 
American government!!,,3 were informed on 16 April 1951. 
By 30 July 1951 significant progress had been achieved: the reactor 
in Kje\1er was ready with the uranium-metal rods, meanwhile clad with 
aluminium, in position. That day the heavy water was pumped up until the 
reactor went critical for the first time. After this succesful start it was given 
the name Joint Establishment Experimental Pile (JEEP).44 
The dynamic start of JEEP presented JENER with some financial 
problems. When the budget for 1951-1952 had been drawn up it was sti\1 
uncertain when JEEP would become operational and so no financial 
resources were reserved for it. An extra contribution of 100,000 Norwegian 
crowns from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence could have provided a 
solution, but the Dutch delegation objected to this because it thought that 
military involvement should be avoided as far as possible. The Netherlands 
was emphasizing the peaceful application of nuclear power. As a compro-
mise it was agreed that the contribution from the Norwegian Ministry of 
Defence would be put into research on the propulsion of ships by nuclear 
power: 'Mr. Beekman would like to point out that it was not the research on 
41 AMES, HOW, Index no. 141, Behandeling van aangelegenheden met betrekking tot 
de Stichting FOM, 1950-1973, Statement on Norwegian-Netherlands Cooperation on Nuclear 
Physics, 15 April 1951. 
42 AMFA, London Embassy, Secret Archive, 1955-64, Box 36, 813.33, Nederland-
Noorwegen Atoomenergie and PRO, F0371193213, Aide-Memoire Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to the Foreign Office, 16 April 1951. 
" Washington National Records Center (hereafter WNRC), Suitland, Maryland, Record 
Group (hereafter RG) 59, Records of the Special Assistant to the Special Assistant to the 
Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Matters, 1944-52, LOT: 570688, Box 51, Folder 21. 
Netherlands General, 1946-52 and National Archives (hereafter NA), Washington DC, RG 
59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Boxes 5980 and 5979, 956.7138/4-1651, Memorandum of 
Conversation with Ambassador Morgenstieme of Norway and Ambassador Van Roijen of 
the Netherlands by Perkins, with Attachments: 'Netherlands and Norwegian Aides-
Memoires', 16 April 1951. 
.. Netherlands Energy Research Foundation (hereafter by its Dutch acronym ECN), 
Petten, First Annual Report JENER, 1951-51, pp. 6-7. 
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ship propulsion by nuclear energy the Dutch delegation was opposed to but 
military work in general'. To which Milatz added: 'Ship propulsion is not 
a military subject'. 45 
The official opening of JEEP took place on 28 November 1951 in the 
presence of Norway's King Haakon and the Dutch Minister for Education 
and Science, F.J. Th. Rutten among others.46 In spite of his poor health 
Kramers was also there. It would be his last contribution to the Norwegian-
Dutch joint venture, which had to a large extent come about as a result of 
his early initiatives: He died 24 April 1952. 
After a few teething problems JEEP was operated day and night five 
days a week from September 1952 onwards. Throughout the normal working 
day the scientific personnel conducted physics experiments; in addition, 
overnight isotope production took place. In the cold months in Norway, 
when the temperature outside was low, a capacity as high as 250 kilowatts 
was reached. However, when the outside temperature increased the reactor 
had to be turned down to prevent the moderating heavy water around the 
nuclear fuel rods from beginning to boil. 47 
JENER had taken off, but some uncertainty had developed concern-
ing the legal connection between NTNF and JENER. The Dutcfr.Nol7Wegian 
contract had been coru:luded between FOM and NTNF .. However, on 1 
January 1948 the Institutt for Atomenergi (IFA) had been set up· to manage 
the Norwegian nuclear FeactoF~ So a worlilirg party was; set up at the 
beginning of 1952 to look into the legal aspects and the organisation of IF A. 
Based on a proposal in the Norwegian parliament (Storting) of 11 July 1953 
a reorganisation was carried out in the second half of 1953, whereby IFA 
was granted the status of an independent foundation and acquired rights of 
ownership over the land, insta1lations and materials of the Norwegian share 
in Kjeller. The purpose of IF A was defined as carrying out ' ... research, 
experiments and other activities with a view to the utilization of atomic 
" FOM, Minutes Joint Commission, 1951-54, Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Joint 
Commission, 30 Nov. 1951, p. 11. 
46 FOM, Minutes Reactor Committee, 1950-52, Minutes of the ninth meeting of the 
Reactor Committee, 28 Aug. 1951, pp. 8-9; NA, RG 59, Decimal Files, 1950-54, Box 5985, 
957.7138/12-1151, J.G. Mein (First Secretary of the US Embassy in Oslo) to State 
Department, 11 Dec. 1951. 
47 ECN, Second Annual Report JENER, 1952-53, p. 13. 
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energy'.48 The agteementwith FOM was duly adapted, so that from 1 
January 1954 IF A in fact looked after Norwegian interests in JENER. 
The 'Wessex Solution' 
As early as November 1950 Randers had proposed to Cockcroft an exchange 
of Norwegian heavy water for British uranium metal rods with a view to 
acquiring more than three and a half tons of uranium metal. That Randers 
wanted more was already apparent before Kramer.s had ordered only three 
tons from Cockcroft, and his desire would become further evident in later 
discussions between Norway and Great Britain. While the joint Norwegian-
Dutch negotiations with the British were going on, the Norwegians therefore 
conducted their own separate discussions, of which the Dutch had only very 
limited knowledge. Because the outcome of these negotiations was to have 
an effect on the course of the Dutch-Norwegian co-operation the next 
paragraphs shall first give a brief outline of the Anglo-Norwegian talks. 
As early as 29 November 1951 a meeting had taken place in Oslo 
between representatives ofNorsk Hydro and the British government. At this 
meeting the Norwegian government, represented through IF A which had in 
the meantime de facto replaced NTNF as regards nuclear energy, put certain 
substantial demands to the British. In exchange for the right to buy twenty 
to twenty-five tons of heavy water, the British government should agree to 
allow the Norwegians to buy up to ten tons of uranium metal and up to a 
hundred tons of graphite. Finally, the exchange of information and 
know-how should be stimulated.49 
These were not trivial requests and presented the British with a 
problem. On the one hand Norsk Hydro wanted an answer as soon as 
possible, otherwise it would sell its heavy water to other prospective buyers. 
On the other hand, the British were obliged to consult the Americans and 
Canadians because of nuclear agreements that covered both the free 
exchange of knowledge and know-how and especially any deliveries of 
uranium metal. The British therefore could not give a definite answer 
quickly. They were also unhappy about the coupling of the sale of metal 
with the purchase of heavy· water: 'This seems to us to be an odd way of 
" Ibid., p. 40 .. 
.. PRO, F0371/99753 and AB6/IB02, Memo by Randers, 17 Jan. 1952. 
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seeking our co-operation' .50 IV. Dunworth, who enjoyed a good relati-
onship with Randers, was brought in to make clear to the Norwegians that 
this link would not be accepted.51 While the negotiations between the 
British Ministry of Supply and Norsk Hydro on the contract to supply heavy 
water proceeded in the normal way, 52 the Foreign Office took steps to 
uncouple the contract with Norsk Hydro from the issues of the supply of 
uranium metal . and the exchange of information and know-how. The 
Norwegians agreed, but added that' ... the Norwegian government assumes 
that Her Majesty's Govermnent will adopt a 'positive attitude' to cooperate 
with Norway in the field of atomic research, both as regards material equip-
ment and exchange of experience' .53 
A British delegation visited Norway in March 1952 to do the 
groundwork for the delivery of twenty-five tons of heavy water to Great 
Britain under the codename 'Wessex Solution'.54 The talks were conducted 
in secret,s5 yet the British delegation brought a sample of twenty-five grams 
of heavy water from Norway for tests at Harwell. A contract was drafted, 
based on the results of these tests and sent to the Norwegians.56 This draft 
was used as a basis for further negotiations between Norsk Hydro and the 
British delegation in Oslo between 10 and 19 May 1952.57 Randers also 
took some part in the talks. Half of the clauses in the concept-contract were 
approved without amendment. Agreement was reached on who on the British 
s. PRO, F0371199753, Makins to Wright, March 1952; France to HaIJlham, 29 March 
1952. 
SI Ibid., France to HaIJlham, 9 April 1952. 
" PRO, AB6/1S02, Wessex Solution: Goodway and Hart-Jones to Eriksen, 14 March 
1952, pp. 3-6. 
53 PRO, F0371199753, British Embassy in Oslo to Foreign Office, Telegram no. 99, 2 
May 1952. 
54 PRO, AB6/1S02, Wessex Solution: Note by Hart-Jones, 31 March 1952, E.7, pp. 15-
16. 
" Despite the fact that both parties· agreed to try to keep the matter secret, at the 
beginning of April 1952 a report suddenly appeared in a Norwegian paper. Ibid., Wessex 
Solution: Hart-Jones to Eriksen, 7 May 1952, E.IO, pp. 25-26. 
" Ibid., Wessex Solution: Hart-Jones to Eriksen, 24 April 1952, E.S, pp. 16-20 and 2 
May 1952, E.9, pp. 20-25. 
57 For a report of these negotiations see: Ibid., Wessex Solution: Heavy Water; Report 
on visit to Norway 10th-19th May, 1952 by V.H. Coleman, F.E. Pounder and C.W. Hart-
Jones, undated, pp. 1-11. 
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side was to take care of inspection and analysis, how the containers were to 
be sealed, who was to clean the containers used to transport the heavy water, 
and to what level they could be filled. In short, immediate agreement was 
reached on the 'housekeeping' matters. Price, quality, secrecy, delivery date 
and payment period produced the usual discussions. Eventually it was agreed 
that the Norwegians would supply Britain with twenty-five tons of heavy 
water for 1,500 Norwegian crowns per kilogram and that the buyer would 
pay for the packing costs. It was further decided that the heavy water would 
preferably be delivered in batches of one thousand kilograms and that the 
first delivery would take place no sooner than 1 October 1952 and the last 
no later than 30 November 1955. If the deliveries of Norwegian heavy water 
were to exceed what Britain needed, the British might export the surplus, but 
only to Commonwealth or NATO countries and in each case the country to 
receive the heavy water had first to be approved by Norway. The agreement 
was treated as secret and was to be referred to as 'Wessex Solution' in all 
correspondence. Only with the approval of both governments might the 
agreement be made public.58 The appendix specified that the hydrogen in 
the heavy water must consist of at least 99.7% deuterium. Also, Norsk 
Hydro was to supply the material with the minimum possible contamination 
by cadmium, boron and lithium.59 After agreement had been reached on 14 
May, the contract, dated 15 May, was signed on 16 May 1952 by V.H. 
Coleman .and C.W. Hart-Jones for the United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
Authority (UKAEA) and Bjame Eriksen and Stephansen for Norsk Hydro. 
More British uranium for Norway 
The contract between Norway and Great Britain for the delivery of heavy 
water was thus entered into without any coupling with an agreement for 
supply of British uranium metal wanted by Randers. True, there was a 
'gentleman's agreement' whereby the British promised to do their best to 
supply Norway with uranium. But Randers foresaw problems with the Dutch 
if he had to let them know about the heavy water contract. The Norwegians 
" Ibid., Wessex Solution: Agreement between the Norsk Hydro-Elektrisk Kvaelstof-
aktieselskab of Oslo in the Kingdom of Norway on the one. part and Her Majesty's Ministry 
of Supply, 15 May 1952, E.l3, pp. 32-37. 
,. Ibid., Wessex Solution: Appendix specified in Clause 2 of the agreement of the 15th 
May, 1952, E.13, pp. 37-38. 
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and Dutch had just concluded intensive negotiations on the exchange of 
(Dutch) uranium oxide for (British) uranium metal rods, which were vitally 
important for the progress of the joint Norwegian-Dutch project. Now, the 
Norwegians had agreed to supply Britain with twenty-five tons of heavy 
water without demanding any uranium in return. Randers therefore let Cock-
croft know that ' ... as a result 1 am now personally responsible for having 
gambled with the future of our whole Dutch-Norwegian cooperative nuclear 
energy project - since exchange ofD20 [heavy water] for U [uranium metal] 
is at present our only source of uranium for our ship-reactor plan .... 1 do not 
personally consider it so much a gamble as a reasonable thing to do as a 
.. connnuationof informal mutual help - where we so far have been at the 
receiving end. 1 shall, however, be criticized rather seriously for not being 
more businesslike - which does not concern me much - but 1 believe that the 
Dutch, with considerable right, may feel that the Norwegians have not 
looked properly after their common interests, if our work should be halted 
as a result of this act on our part'. 60 
Since Cockcroft had learned in the meantime of Norwegian and 
Dutch plans possibly to start a new project building a nuclear reactor with 
the French (a lot of French know-how went into the building of JEEP), he 
came to the view ' ... that we ought to make arrangements to supply these 
small quantities of uranium to the Norwegian-Dutch project. Otherwise we 
shall find them firmly coupled to the French project'. He was thinking in 
terms of a delivery of three tons of uranium metal for the current Nor-
wegian-Dutch reactor project and seven tons for the future reactor, ten tons 
altogether. Given that the British did not have any stocks available, uranium 
from ore from the Belgian Congo could be a possibility,6' but secret agree-
ments made with the United States and Canada during the Second World 
War stood in the way of such a transaction,,2 Portuguese uranium seemed 
to offer a way out for the Norwegian-Dutch project: 'I would suggest 
.60 PRO, F0371199753, Randers to Cockcroft, 25 May 1952. 
61 During the Second World War the control of the uranium deposits in Belgian Congo 
were transferred by the Belgian government to the United States and Great Britain. These 
secret negotiations are described in: J.E. Helmrech, Gathering Rare Ores. The Diplomacy 
of Uranium Acquisition. /939-/954 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
198.6). . . 
62 The Quebec Agreement of August 19, 1943; The Anglo-American Declaration of 
Trust, June 13, 1944; and the Roosevelt-Churchill Hyde Park Aide-Memoire, September 19, 
1944. . 
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therefore that we obtain the concession of the U.S. to the supply of up to 10 
tons of uranium metal derived from Portuguese ore, over the next 3 
years,.63 As far as price was concerned, Randers offered to exchange one 
ton of heavy water for three tons of uranium metal valued at twenty-five 
thousand English pounds per ton.64 The Norwegians were required to make 
a formal request to the British government and did so on 9 September 
1952.6' 
It was necessary to obtain permission from the United States. The 
British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Christopher Steel, was therefore 
instructed to discuss supplying Norway with three tons of uranium in the 
short term and seven tons in the longer term. In view of the short term 
planning for the supply of the three tons, the lack of sufficient stocks in 
Great Britain, and the difficulties in purifying Portuguese uranium, the 
British proposed that three tons of uranium from the Belgian Congo be 
delivered as a 'loan' to be replaced by uranium from Portuguese stocks as 
soon as it became available.66 The American government's response, in this 
case fromR. Gordon Ameson, was cautious. According to the British this 
was because of the fact that American thinking was dominated ' ... by the 
atmosphere of secrecy which surrounds the whole question of atomic energy 
in this country but it is also due to the fact that his mind, like that of most 
Americans, is not really attuned to think of uranium except in relation to the 
defence effort'. Ameson did, nevertheless, agree with the British that ' ... it 
was desirable that the Norwegians should obtain their uranium from us rather 
than from some other supplier'."7 The door remained ajar. 
In the second week of January 1953 Cockcroft, who had been 
authorised by the British government to inform the Belgians, visited Pierre 
Ryckmans, head of the Belgian Atomic Energy Cornmission and former 
governor-general of the Belgian Congo, in Brussels. The Americans were 
more or less bypassed. Because Steel had been unable to speak to Gordon 
E. Dean, the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Cornmission 
(USAEC), on account of the public holiday, he left a letter for him outlining 
63 PRO, AB6/914, Note: 'Collaboration with Norway', by Cockcroft, 29 May 1952. 
64 PRO, F0371199753, Randers to Cockcroft, 17 July 1952. 
os Ibid., Aide-Memoire from the Royal Norwegian Embassy to Her Majesty's 
Government, 9 Sept. 1952 . 
.. 12 Ibid, Makins to Stee~ 3 Nov. 1952. 
67 Ibid., Tomkins to Harpham, 7 Nov. 1952.· 
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the British plans. Although the Americans had not been asked for their 
assent, Arneson let it be known that he was in agreement with the British 
plan and ' ... expressed the hope that the Belgians will be made aware of 
American interest in the Norwegian transaction', which caused the British 
to remark sarcastically that this ' ... like the original proposal for consultation 
on a joint Anglol American basis, is a clumsy attempt to gain credit with the 
Belgians by showing them that they have their interests at heart'. 68 
During his visit to Brussels Cockcroft told Ryckmans about the 
Norwegian request for a total of ten tons of uranium metal, of which three 
tons was needed in the short term. The remaining seven tons could be 
discussed at a later stage. Although a small quantity of Portuguese uranium 
could be obtained, uranium from the Belgian Congo was preferred. 
Ryckmans was asked if he would cooperate with this arrangement and was 
told that the request had the support of the United States.69 After consulting 
his minister, Ryckmans agreed. Everything had to be confirmed in writing 
later but a verbal agreement was reached.70 Cockcroft was pleased to be 
able to report to Randers: 'I think we are pretty certain now to be able to 
supply you with the uranium metal which you require and 1 am asking Dr. 
Goodway to open up formal negotiations with you on this basis'.7! 
The next stage was to obtain the official approval of the United 
States of the deal. It might take some days, said Arneson. The Americans 
were expected to put forward the same conditions as they had done for the 
British delivery of (three tons of) uranium metal to the Netherlands, namely: 
no exchange of secret information on production processes and an express 
statement that the American government had approved the transaction.72 
This supposition proved to be correct; the Americans laid down precisely the 
same conditions, to which the British were also able to agree.73 With these 
provisos, the Americans agreed to the delivery of three tons of uranium. The 
question of the remaining seven tons would have to be decided at a later 
.. PRO, AB6/1I 04, Tomkins to Harpham, 8 Jan 1953 . 
.. Ibid., Cockcroft to Ryckmans, 20 Jan. 1953. 
7. PRO, F0371199753, Cabinet Office to B.J.S.M. Washington, CANAM 418,22 Jan. 
1953; PRO, AB6/1I04 and AB6/914, Cockcroft to Goodway, 23 Jan. 1953. 
71 PRO, AB61I 104, Cockcroft to Randers, 20 Jan. 1953. 
72 Ibid., Tomkins to Harpham, 23 Jan. 1953. 
13 Ibid., France to Harpham, 18 Feb. 1953. 
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date.74 On 24 February 1953 the Norwegian government could be informed 
that ' ... with the concurrence of the United States and Canadian Govern-
ments, they have now given permission for the delivery of this material'. 7S 
After all the formal consents had been obtained, N.F. Goodway, on 
behalf of the British government, was able to get to work on converting the 
'gentleman's agreement' into a contract to supply uranium to Norway. In his 
letter to Cockcroft of 17 July 1952 Randers had already proposed exchang-
ing three tons of uranium for one ton of heavy water and Goodway took this 
up. In the meantime Britain had signed a contract with Norsk Hydro for a 
delivery of twenty-five tons of heavy water, which they now wanted to 
increase to thirty tons. Goodway therefore proposed drawing up a contract 
to settle both requests on mutual terms.76 The three tons of uranium could 
be delivered within four weeks.77 
The issue of the three tons of uranium to replace the stocks in Kjeller 
was now settled. The other seven tons still had to be dealt with. The British 
asked themselves what would be the best strategic course of action. They 
could tell the Norwegians straight away that they were able to deliver 
another seven tons or they could wait for a while until a better deal could 
be struck over the extra five tons of heavy water.7S It was decided not to 
resort to horse dealing: 'As a general principle it is best to be quite 
straightforward and above board when dealing with the Norwegians'. By 
handling the matter as straightforwardly as possible the British expected that 
they ' ... would gain kudos by telling the Norwegians about the extra seven 
tons. This kudos would itself be a bargaining counter and would strengthen 
our case for asking for the extra five tons of heavy water and further 
supplies when required'.79 It was better to keep pressure on Norsk Hydro 
itself via the diplomatic channels of the Foreign Office and the British 
74 Ibid., Ameson to Tomkins, 30 Jan. 1953. 
75 Ibid., Aide-M~moire from Her Majesty's Government to the Norwegian Charge 
d' Affaires, 24 feb. 1953. 
76 Ibid., Goodway to Randers, 29 Jan. 1953. 
77 Ibid., Goodway to Randers, 30 March 1953. 
71 Ibid., Hmpham to France, 7 March 1953; Wilson to France, 25 March 1953; Hmpham 
to Wright, 13 April 1953. 
79 Ibid., Goodden to Hmpham, 22 April 1953. 
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Embassy in Os10.8O Any coupling of the two matters was rejected out of 
hand. 
On 29 April 1953 the Foreign Office sent an Aide-Memoire to the 
Norwegian government informing it that, not only did the British agree to 
the delivery of three tons of uranium to replenish the stocks in Kjeller, but 
that consent had come in from the American and Canadian governments to 
the delivery of the additional seven tons of requested uranium metal.81 The 
first three tons was shipped to Norway on the Truro on 25 May.82 
Talks on the remaining seven tons of uranium metal did not take 
place until 1954. On 12 January of that year Goodway told Randers that' ... 
the balance of 7 tons is now available and could be supplied to you under 
the authority which we received through the Ministry of Supply'. If Randers 
could agree to the same terms and conditions as applied to the earlier 
delivery of the three tons he should let the British know, after which 
delivery could take place.83 
The discussions around the supply of the seven tons took a surprising 
turn in March 1954. The secretary of the Dutch Reactor Committee, 
Beekman, wrote in a letter to Cockcroft: 'We learned from Mr. Randers that 
he has - on the basis of an existing agreement - a claim on 7 tons of English 
uranium at the price of 25.0.0 English pounds per kg. Mr. Randers wrote us 
that he is willing to waive his rights in our favour. We should, now, like to 
know, if you think it will be possible to sell the 7 tons Ill'anium to us'. 8. 
Cockcroft let Beekman know that there would be no objection to this, 
provided '... Dr. Randers lets me have a letter to this effect'. At the same 
time Milatz and J.H. de Boer, substitute member of the Joint Commission, 
were given permission to visit Harwell to talk about this and other matters. 
After that the Dutch took over from the Norwegians in the negotiations with 
the British. Why Randers took this remarkable step was not revealed in the 
archives. 
so Ibid., Wilson to France, 4 May 1953. 
" Ibid., Peck to Goodden, 29 May 1953; Enclosure: • Aide-M~moire from Her Majesty's 
Government to the Councillor oflbe Norwegian Embassy', 28 May 1953. 
" Ibid., Goodway to Randers, 14 May 1953. 
83 Ibid., Goodway to Randers, 12 Jan. 1954 . 
... Ibid., Beekman to Cockcroft, 16 March 1954. 
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BEPOP and SLURRYPOP 
Within JENER plenty of discussions were taking place about plans for the 
future, but in the Netherlands itself ideas were also being explored. The 
experimental nuclear reactor in Kjeller (JEEP) had been working contin-
uously with an output of around 250 kilowatts for quite some time. It was 
necessary to break new ground. Highest priority was given to building a 
nuclear reactor on Dutch soil. 
Milatz and Dahl had already been doing informal calculations for the 
construction of a 10,000 kilowatt nuclear reactor. 85 Randers foresaw an 
important application for this in ship propulsion: 'Ship propulsion seems to 
be a necessary thing for us to take up. It is a sound idea to design a 10,000 
kw reactor and put it into a ship'. From this standpoint he argued in favour 
of making nuclear-powered ships a priority. The Dutch delegation was more 
reticent about this, because ' ... the Americans have a large submarine hull 
under construction, a land-based reactor model for this has already been 
built, and two different types of submarine motors are under construct-
ion'.86 Some degree of patience was therefore appropriate. In addition to 
these pragmatic considerations, the Netherlands and Norway also had 
different points of departure for the application of nuclear power. The 
Netherlands was dependent upon the dwindling production of the Limburg 
coal mines and the import of oil, and saw nuclear power primarily as the 
solution to its energy problem. The Norwegians had hydroelectric power 
and were more interested in using nuclear power in their large merchant 
fleet. This opposition between the use of nuclear power on land versus ship 
propulsion came to the surface regularly during subsequent Norwegian-Dutch 
co-operation. 
Milatz and Dahl made the assumption that for either application the 
reactor would work using natural uranium with heavy water as moderator. 
Obtaining enough raw uranium and heavy water was not seen as a stumbling 
block. Norsk Hydro had already indicated its willingness to guarantee the 
sums involved for the purchase of three tons of uranium and 'from Sweden 
" FOM, Minutes Reactor Committee, 1950-52, Minutes ofthe twelfth meeting of the 
Reactor Committee, \3 May 1952, p. 5 . 
.. FOM, Minutes Joint Commission, 1951-54, Minutes of the sixth meeting of the Joint 
Commission, 21 May 1952, p.3. 
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and other sources more uranium is to be expected so the uranium will not 
be a problem'. No problems at all were anticipated with the acquisition of 
heavy water since ' ... Norsk Hydro has been extending its production of 
heavy water, a sufficient quantity will be available'. 
A JENER working party on reactor development, consisting of the 
Dutchmen M. Bogaardt and I. Pelser, the Norwegian v.o. Eriksen and the 
Swiss W. Hiilg, were considering the question of which type of heavy water 
reactor should be chosen for the next joint project. There were three 
possibilities from which a choice had to be made: a homogeneous reactor 
(that is one in which the uranium raw material and the moderator are 
combined in a single mixture) and reactors with fuel rods, clad either with 
aluminium or with beryllium oxide. Once the working party had chosen one 
of these options, Dahl would have to advise on whether the chosen reactor 
type could be built.87 
The reactor design finally suggested would have a thick-walled steel 
vessel, filled with twelve tons of heavy water in which nine tons of uranium 
was suspended in the form of metal rods. The rods were to be surrounded 
by water jackets, through which heavy water would also flow to conduct the 
heat from the fission away to a heat exchanger where steam would be raised 
to produce electricity. Since the neutrons would be better slowed down the 
lower the temperature of the moderator, it was necessary to insulate 
thermally the heavy water jackets with beryllium oxide. In order to make 
plain that the aim was to produce useful energy and not to 'breed' plut-
onium, this design was initially designated BEPOP, for Beryllium Power-
Only-Pile. 
Meanwhile in the Netherlands 1.1. Went, of the research centre of the 
joint Dutch electric utilities KEMA (NV tot Keuring van Electrotechnische 
Materialen te Amhem), which had formal links with FOM in the field of 
nuclear reactors, had become convinced that the rods of uranium in a reactor 
of this kind would only have a short life so that they would have to be 
replaced many times. This led him to conceive of a similar reactor in which 
fmely ground uranium oxide as a suspension, or to use the English word 
'slurry', would be pumped through the water jackets and the heat exchanger, 
and also through an installation that would continuously remove the fission 
products. This plan, which was soon given the name SLURRYPOP (Slurry 
Power Only Pile), or SUSPOP, also suited the ambitions of KEMA to have 
their own reactor. 
87 Ibid., Minutes of the seventh meeting of the Joint Commission, 80ct: 1952; p. 7. 
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Randers, however, had some doubts regarding the feasibility of 
SLURRYPOP and he expressed them in Dahl's presence at a meeting on 19 
January 1953 in Utrecht in front of Bakker, Beekman, De Boer, Milatz and 
Went.88 It was agreed that a joint decision would be made in Norway at a 
later date as to whether it would be possible to operate this reactor with 
natural uranium and, if not, what grade of uranium would need to be 
enriched in the fissionable isotope uranium-235. 89 This was the first time 
that the enrichment of uranium was mentioned! 
In the Joint Commission of 15 and 16 April 1953 the foundation was 
formally laid for the second phase of the Norwegian-Dutch project: the 
nuclear power reactor. While the Dutch delegation laid the emphasis on 
SLURRYPOP, the Norwegian delegation preferred BEPOP: ' ... The BEPOP 
is a possible solution while for SLURRYPOP everything depends upon the 
slurry'. The plans for BEPOP had come about based on the recom-
mendations of Dahl who had expressed a preference for it. As a compromise 
it was decided further to develop both ideas simultaneously, while 'It was 
assumed that the special problems for the SLURRYPOP would make this 
type a longer term proj ect, while detailed planning could already be started 
on the BEPOP type'.9O The intention behind both projects was to gain 
experience with a prototype with a view to the possible construction of 
power stations or ship propulsion machines. As far as the choice of location 
of a prototype reactor was concerned, the Joint Commission gave four 
alternatives: a site in the Netherlands; a disused merchant ship; a specially 
built lighter which could be warped in both the Netherlands and Norway; 
and last of all in Kjeller. The first option fitted in perfectly with the Dutch 
plans. 
Once the formal basis had been laid, the question of raw materials 
arose. The most important raw materials for both BEPOP and SLURRYPOP 
were beryllium oxide, uranium raw material and heavy water. With respect 
to beryllium oxide the following was agreed: Randers would contact France 
and Great Britain and the mineral sources in Norway and Indonesia (Billiton) 
BB FOM, Minutes Reactor Committee, 1953, Minutes of the seventeenth meeting of the 
Reactor Committee, 20 Feb. 1953, with Enclosure: 'Summary of the informal discussion on 
"Netherlands ideas about quasi-homogeneous reactors"', 19 Jan. 1953 . 
.. Ibid., Enclosure: 'Notulen van Went's overzicht bij agendapunt 6.31 van de Reactor 
Commissie vergadering van 20 juli 1953'. 
90 FOM, Minutes Joint Commission, 195 I-54, Minutes of the eighth meeting of the Joint 
Commission, 15-16 April 1953, pp. 6-8. 
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would be mapped. The search for available uranium raw material would take 
place both at home and abroad. At home the Norwegians would stimulate 
exploration work in Norway and the Dutch in Surinam. Abroad Beekman 
and Bakker would talk to the Belgians during their planned visit to Leuven 
in Belgium about the possibility of a delivery of uranium. The heavy water 
was mainly a budget issue. Norsk Hydro was fully prepared to sell the 
necessary quantity of heavy water. During talks with Stephansen and 
Randers, Milatz succeeded in obtaining a promise for the delivery of heavy 
water: four tons would be made available in the short term. A proviso was 
made that the delivery must be kept secret from Great Britain. It was agreed 
that FOM would write to the managing director of Norsk Hydro, Eriksen, 
referring to a conversation between Randers and Eriksen, and asking for a 
quotation. A delivery of four tons would be made to Kjeller, so that if news 
of the delivery were to leak out, it could be said that the four tons were the 
use of JENER:I 
The choice of BEPOP 
The Norwegian-Dutch joint project to build an experimental nuclear power 
reactor opened therefore on two fronts: the construction of a beryllium oxide 
heavy water reactor (BEPOP) and that of a slurry reactor (SDSPOP), for the 
latter an 'exponential experiment', that is to say a sub-critical reactor, would 
first be necessary. Co-operation with France was not ruled out. The gain to 
be had from this co-operation would consist of the gathering of as much 
information as possible for as little money as possible. In 1950 the French 
had already set aside one hundred million guilders for nuclear research and 
had declared themselves willing to finance thirty percent of the cost of 
founding a West European nuclear research centre. Talks in Paris with the 
French Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique (CEA) on 12 and 13 June 1953 
ended in a proposal to engage in limited co-operation on the construction of 
a nuclear power reactor in the Netherlands, in which the Norwegians would 
make their experience available and take care that the necessary twelve tons 
of heavy water would be supplied from Kjeller on time. France would 
provide the necessary expertise and facilities, such as supplying the 
beryllium oxide and metallurgical expertise and conducting the necessary 
91 Ibid., pp. 9-10; and Minutes Reactor Committee, 1953, Minutes of the nineteenth 
meeting of the Reactor Committee, 22 May 1953, pp. 9-10. 
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experiments.92 The capital expenditure for the reactor fell of course upon 
the Netherlands. Although the new reactor was actually identical to BEPOP, 
it was given the name NUPOP (Natural Uranium Power-Only-Pile) to 
emphasise the use of natural uranium as fuel rather than refer to the 
insulation material. It was in no way the intention to put aside the SLURRY-
POP plan, but - as had already been decided in the Joint Commission - to 
build NUPOP first since this was able to be realised in the short term and 
SLURRYPOP only in the longer term. For the Dutch NUPOP held another 
attraction: it was not only a prototype reactor in its own right, but would 
have a sufficiently large neu1;ron flux to make it suitable for testing materials 
and therefore alsO for research into the stability of suspensioIiS in a· reactor. 
Finally, it would serve as a prototype of a ship's reactor. Against these 
advantages of NUPOP had to be set various disadvantages of SUSPOP. In 
the meantime, in addition.to the heterogeneous model mentioned earlier (in 
which the nuclear fuel suspension would pass through channels separated 
from the moderator), a really homogeneous design had been conceived, in 
which both would pass through the reactor vessel as one mixture. This would 
get around certain construction problems but, on the other hand, such a 
reactor would certainly not be critical with natural uranium and so the 
Reactor Committee, the working group on the reactor within FOM, needed 
to face up to ' ... the question of whether enriched material would definitely 
have to be used which has not yet been answered, even in the U.S.A.'."' 
During the conference on heavy water reactors held in Kjeller from 
11 to 13 August 1953, to which nineteen countries sent representatives, Dahl 
presented 'his' design for the NUPOP reactor and the discussion which had 
taken place in the Netherlands on whether to begin with NUPOP or 
SLURRYPOP continued. In response to these discussions Milatz concluded 
that neither plan expressly ruled out the other, but '... the experimental 
energy reactor [Dahl's NUPOP] must be designed in such a way that it 
enables materials to be tested and developed (including the Slurry) at high 
temperatures and radiation intensities ('material testing reactor')' .94 
" FOM, Minutes Reactor Committee, 1953, Minutes of the twentieth meeting of the 
Reactor Committee, 19 June 1953, pp. 1-9. 
93 Ibid., Minutes of the twenty-first meeting of the Reactor Committee, 24 June 1953, 
pp. 6-10. 
"Ibid., Minutes of the twimty-second meeting of the Reactor Committee, I Sep!. 1953, 
p. 13 and Minutes Joint Commission, 1951-54, Minutes of the ninth meeting of the Joint 
Commission,p. 2, with Enclosure: 'Press-release on heavy-water reactor conference', 17 
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Because of the position taken by the Norwegians, the Netherlands 
was more or less driven to choose NUPOP. Moreover Randers was less 
interested in a reactor for electricity production than for ship propulsion. 
Like Dahl he thought NUPOP most suitable for this. If the Dutch wanted to 
have a nuclear power reactor in their own country, they must opt for 
NUPOP now, if not Randers would do it himself; nine tons of (extra British) 
uranium metal and the necessary heavy water had already been reserved for 
this purpose. Randers was certainly prepared to support SUSPOP in the 
Netherlands, but only when it was founded on the construction ofNUPOP. 
As well as Norwegian support for the construction of NUPOP in the 
Netherlands, contacts with France also played an important role. In short, the 
priority given to the construction of NUPOP over SLURRYPOP was 
determined by three factors. Firstly, the political aspect: if a start were to be 
made on the building ofNUPOP in the Netherlands, FOM would be able to 
get hold of the necessary raw materials at short notice, heavy water from 
Norway and uranium metal from Norway and/or France. So it was a superb 
opportunity to guarantee the material position of the Dutch plans, including 
SLURRYPOP. Secondly, the direct contacts with France would bring in 
advantages: in the future it might be possible to obtain enriched material, 
and contact with French metallurgical experts could be rewarding. Thirdly, 
the scientific aspect: in Milatz's view NUPOP could serve as a materials 
testing reactor that could have great value in overcoming the technological 
problems associated with the construction of the SLURRYPOP. The 
Netherlands indicated that SLURRYPOP had by no means disappeared from 
sight but had rather been pushed into the background by tactical consider-
ations.9S 
Detailed planning 
The detailed planning for the construction of a nuclear power reactor in the 
Netherlands progressed less smoothly. The Reactor Committee, in this case 
Milatz and Beekman, had laid the foundations: a reactor in the Netherlands 
using heavy water from Norway and uranium from France, with work 
beginning initially on NUPOP and later on SLURRYPOP. The Governing 
Aug. 1953; ECN, Second Annual Report JENER, 1952-53, p. 39. 
" FOM, Minutes Reactor Committee, 1953, Minutes of the twenty-third meeting of the 
Reactor Committee, 3 Nov. 1953, pp. 7-10. 
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Council of FOM, which had the final say over the Reactor Committee's 
plans, did not take decisions quickly. The members of the Governing 
Council had their hands full with the Kluyver Committee,96 and with 
representatives of various .ministries, industry and the business community. 
Support from the business community was of the utmost importance since 
the need for funds was urgent because the fmances ofFOM were insufficient 
for these new plans. 
A decision was eventually taken in the meeting of the Governing 
Council ofFOM on 31 December 1953. A 'Proposal to construct a 10,000 
kw reactor centre in the Netherlands' was drafted and sent on 4 January to 
the Ministries of Education;. the Arts and Science, Finance and EconoIilic 
Affairs. The term reactor centre was now used not only to mean the 
construction ofNUPOP, but also included the possibility of further research. 
Total investment was budgeted at 28 million guilders with running costs 
estimated at 1 million guilders per year. In view of the considerable amounts 
involved, expenses were to be shared between the state (50%), KEMA (25%) 
and a number of other industries (25%).97 
It was not without good reason that the Reactor Committee had 
pushed for a speedy decision. It had become clear during the heavy water 
conference in Kjeller in August 1953, that a number of countries were 
venturing on heavy water reactors; demand for heavy water would be great. 
It was therefore decided during the meeting of the Joint Commission on 11 
and 12 February 1954 - ahead of the debate in the Dutch parliament - to 
disclose the Dutch plans concerning NUPOP and SUSPOP to the Nor-
wegians.98 Not surprisingly, Randers urged the Dutch to make a choice 
between the two projects.99 
.. The Dutch government had set up the Kluyver Committee to advise on the 
organisation of nuclear research. Initially it suggested creating a new foundation which 
would engage in nuclear reactor development. FOM would then confine itself to pure 
academic research; The Governing Council of FOM resisted this suggestion and managed 
to fiustrate it - temporarily. 
" FOM, Minutes Governing Council FOM, 1952-60, Minutes of the meeting of the 
Governing Council of FOM, 31 Dec. 1953, pp. 5-15 . 
.. FOM, Minutes Reactor Committee, 1954-55, Minutes of the twenty-fifth.meeting of 
the Reactor Committee, 28 Jan. 1954, p. 9. 
" FFRM, Minut~s Joint Commission, 1951-54, Minutes of the tenth meeting of the Joint 
Commission, 11-12 Feb. 1954, p. 3. 
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The Dutch delegation was able to clarify matters to their Norwegian 
colleagues at the meeting of the Joint Commission on 26 and 27 July 1954. 
In the meantime FOM had signed the so-called 'small contracts' with 
industrial firms, which gave more financial elbow room for both the current 
and the future reactor project. The financial position had been further 
strengthened by the adoption on 14 July 1954 by the Lower House of the 
'Proposal to construct a 10,000 kw reactor centre in the Netherlands' with 
only the Dutch Communist Party voting against. The Norwegian-Dutch joint 
venture was enthusiastically supported. The contract with Norsk Hydro to 
supply fourteen tons of heavy water could now also be signed. Only the 
place where the nuclear reactor would be situated in the Netherlands had not 
yet been discussed. The Norwegian-Dutch agreements relating to the 
construction of a nuclear power reactor in the Netherlands now needed to be 
laid down in a contract as had been done when JENER was formed. IF A 
would contribute to the cost of research carried out in the Dutch reactor as 
FOM had with the Norwegian reactor in Kjeller. At the same time Randers 
- thinking in terms of symmetry - would be able to provide the Netherlands 
with uranium, in view of Norway's claim upon a delivery of ten tons of 
uranium from Great Britain and five tons from Sweden. The Norwegian 
government would have to agree to the delivery of uranium to the Netherlan-
ds. No Norwegian would be a· member of the executive committee of the 
Dutch project, as there were no Dutchmen on the executive committee of 
IF A. The contract only covered the construction and inception of 
NUPOP. IOO 
From 28 to 30 september, Milatz, Dahl and Randers held further talks 
in Kjeller on the draft agreement with IF A on the construction of a reactor 
in the Netherlands. The formal basis for these 'Planning Committee' 
discussions was the joint construction ofNUPOP. The suggestion previously 
brought forward in the FOM Reactor Committee to build SUSPOP first was 
not discussed, since it had been decided in the meeting of the Reactor 
Committee of 2 September 1954 to say nothing about this before a policy 
had been reached in the Netherlands itself. The talks progressed with 
difficulty. An important cause was the Dutch delayin signing the contract 
between FOM and Norsk Hydro for the delivery of the sixteen tons of heavy 
water needed for NUPOP, which aroused doubts on the Norwegian side 
'00 Ibid., Minutes of the eleventh meeting of the Joint Commission, 26-27 July 1954, pp. 
2-4 and FOM, Minutes Reactor Committee, 1954-55, Minutes of the twenty-ninth meeting 
of the Reactor Committee, 17 July 1954, pp. 12-13. 
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about the real intentions of the Dutch. It was decided that the 'NUPOP 
Planning and Coordinating Committee (PCC)' - the new name for the 
Planning Committee - would develop a total package of plans and a 
cost-saving proposal for NUPOP. This package would be put before the Joint 
Commission before any further steps could be taken. From an earlier visit 
to the Netherlands Dahl had become convinced that the many scientists there 
would prefer a research reactor such as JEEP, without a steel pressure vessel 
but with a higher neutron flux, which could also be used for testing 
materials. He therefore stated that he was prepared to consider one of 
Milatz's ideas, TWINPOP, where a reactor of this type would be built next 
to NUPOP, so that the expensive heavy water would be available to be used 
in either. 101 
Choices needed thus to be made. There were a number of pos-
sibilities, and these were augmented by a spectacular turn in American 
policy, as heralded by President Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' proposal. 
The end of the American policy of secrecy bode new perspectives for Dutch 
desires. It is not surprising therefore that the Dutch decided to go through 
everything systematically and carefully to reexamine all the possibilities. 
This reorientation was to lead, among other things, to the setting up of the 
Foundation Reactor Centre Netherlands (RCN) in July 1955. This organi-
sation took over the work of FOM, just as IF A had done with NTNF in 
Norway. This meant that the Norwegian-Dutch project had to be adapt-
ed.102 
The second Norwegian-Dutch agreement 
A Norwegian proposal regarding the continuation of the Norwegian-Dutch 
. project, which needed to be modified as a consequence of the setting up of 
the new Foundation RCN, contained a number of conditions which proved 
to be difficult to accept under the new circumstances in the Netherlands. 
101 FOM, Minutes Reactor Committee, 1954-55, Minutes of the thirty-first meeting of 
the Reactor Committee, 7 Oct. 1954, pp. 8-9. 
102 AMFA, Code 8, 1955-64, Index no. 11 ID, Director-General for the Industrialisation 
and Energy Supply to Zijlstra, 30 June 1955; FOM, Minutes Reactor Committee, 1954-55, 
Minutes of the forty-first meeting of the Reactor Committee, 28 Sept. 1955, p. I; PRO, 
. F0371/125236, Copy of the deed of Foundation of the Netherlands Reactor Centre, 6 July 
1955. 
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Under the former arrangements the Joint Commission, in which both parties 
had equal representation, had laid down the principal areas of research. This 
arrangement could now mean that while the Netherlands would be financing 
the Reactor Centre virtua1ly alone, the Norwegians would have fifty percent 
representation. The Dutch objected. Nevertheless, on the occasion of the 
twelfth meeting of the Joint Commission on 25 and 26 January 1955, the 
. Dutch delegation stated that it attached high value to continuing co-operation 
with the Norwegians. Since the Norwegians were starting from the same 
basic principle there seemed to be an adequate basis for an agreement. The 
starting point would be that both parties, that is RCN in the Netherlands and 
IFA in Norway, would be autonomous and would have to cover their own 
costs. The Joint Commission would have an advisory role and would have 
no decision-making power over the programmes of either organisation. The 
Norwegians were able to accept these basic principles.103 At the meeting 
of the Joint Commission on 2 November 1955 two agreements were 
concluded between RCN and IF A. The first was a general agreement to work 
together as had been agreed in the Joint Commission in January 1955, except 
that an extra section was adopted enabling joint projects to be started which 
departed from these principles, for which a separate agreement would be 
necessary. This then was the basis for a second agreement, safeguarding the 
continued survival of JENER for three years until 30 June 1958.104 The 
advantage of this new arrangement was that both countries had their hands 
free for projects which lay outside the scope of JENER. Before this time 
nuclear energy research in both countries had more or less fallen within the 
framework of the cooperative agreement or had been subordinate to it. Now 
the opportunities for each country to have its own nuclear projects were 
considerably enhanced. 
103 FOM, Minutes Reactor Committee, 1954-55, Minutes of the thirty-sixth meeting of 
the Reactor Committee, 3 March 1955, pp. 8-9; AMFA, Code 8, 1955-64, Index no. 880, 
Kasa and Beekman to the members of the Joint Commission, 3 March 1955, with 
Enclosures: 'Draft Agreement IFA and FOM (FOM-1486)', 2 March 1955 and 'Draft 
Agreement on the Joint Establishment for Nuclear Energy Research (FOM-150 I)', 2 March 
1955. 
104 FOM, Minutes Joint Commission, 1955-58, Minutes of the fourteenth meeting of the 
Joint Commission, 1-2 Nov. 1955; Archives Ministry of Economic Affairs (hereafter 
AMEA), The Hague, Archief Direktie Kernenergie (hereafter ADK), Index no. 307, 
Agreement on Joint Establishment for Nuclear Energy Research (JENER) and IF A and 
RCN, 2 Nov. 1955. 
34 
Even before the new JENER agreement came into being it had 
become clear to the Norwegians that NUPOP would not be built in the 
Netherlands. The 28 million guilders reserved for it would be used to buy 
an American reactor, following negotiations with the United States which 
had opened up new opportunities for the Dutch which they were eager to 
use. But also, after long negotiations, agreement was reached with Great 
Britain for the delivery of one kilo of uranium-235 before I August 1955. 
The price was 20,000 English pounds.IOS In Kjeller the NUPOP plan had 
been reconsidered and a modified reactor design produced in which the 
heavy water would boil, doing away with the problem of thermal insulation. 
This meant that a temperature of only 150 degrees Celsius could be 
achieved, but a paper factory in Halden proved to be interested in having 
this reactor built on its site as a heat source. An OEECI06 project presently 
started around the Halden Boiling Water Reactor in which the Netherlands 
initially participated through EURATOM. IO? For many years Kjeller 
continued to be a place where new RCN staff went to gain experience with, 
among other things, the design of and experiments with the Halden reactor 
and the construction of an installation for reprocessing spent fuel rods from 
JEEP. Professor lA. Goedkoop, who was connected with JENER from 1952 
to 1959, called the period of the second JENER contract on the one hand the 
best and most fruitful years, but on the other hand the beginning of the end: 
'Meanwhile it had become clear that in the long run, when the various 
reactor projects had got into their stride, JENER's role would have to 
diminish, and that therefore 1955 had only brought a stay of execution for 
a few more years'. 108 
10' AMFA, London Embassy, Secret Archive, 1955-64, Box 36, 813.33, Nederland-
Verenigd Koninkrijk Atoomenergie, 1955-57, Went to Dunworth, 30 Dec. 1954; PRO, 
AB6/1488, Dunworth to Cockcroft, 28 Oct. 1954 and Punnett to Milatz, undated. 
106 The Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was initially created 
to organize the American Marshall Plan and became an impetus to further economic 
unification in Western Europe. The OEEC also worked on atomic energy. 
107 In the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957 the six countries of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) established a European Atomic Energy Community, better known 
as EURATOM. 
lOB Goedkoop, Geschiedenis van de Noors-Neder/andse samenwerking op het gebiedvan 
de kernenergie, p. 134. 
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The third agreement: the end of JENER 
The second JENER agreement ran out on 30 June 1958. At the eighteenth 
meeting of the Joint Commission on 3 and 4 December 1957 a committee 
of four members, comprising W.A. de Haas, W. Reyseger, Hauge and Kasa, 
was given the task of revising the JENER contract. To give them sufficient 
time, it was proposed to extend the existing 1955 agreement for a one-year 
bridging period until 30 June 1959.109 The Committee of Four met twice, 
in The Hague on 24 January 1958 and in Paris on 21 February, and drew up 
a draft agreement, which would replace both the general agreement of 2 
November 1954 and that on JENER of the same date. The plan was to 
discuss this draft agreement at the meeting of the Joint Commission on 17 
and 18 March 1958 and to round it off in no more than two subsequent 
committee meetings. 1 \0 The basic principle was adopted that it was 
desirable to keep up the co-operation as far as possible and where ever 
possible to intensify it. On the other hand it was agreed that, in view of the 
rapid developments in the field of the peaceful application of nuclear power 
in both countries, it was not possible to keep JENER in its existing form, 
given that it was hardly possible for RCN, for example, to obtain adequate 
fmancing. Furthermore, IF A objected to doing all its national work within 
JENER. The draft contract therefore enabled both countries to do research 
under a jointly agreed programme, parts of which would be carried out as 
joint projects in both centres. Up to then it had been unclear where the 
territory of IF A stopped and that of JENER began. 
Under the new agreement part of the work, and possibly also part of 
the work in the Netherlands, would be carried out jointly under the auspices 
of the Joint Netherlands-Norwegian Commission for Nuclear Energy 
Research, which was to be set up as the successor to the Joint Commission. 
At each national centre 'integrated groups', to which both of the contracting 
parties would contribute financial resources and expert staff, would carry out 
the work together. Outside these programmes both parties would be free to 
carry out their own national research. Both countries could therefore decide, 
on a case by case basis, which parts of their national programmes they 
'09 FOM, Minutes Joint Commission, 1955-58, Minutes of the eighteenth meeting of the 
Joint Commission, 3-4 Dec. 1957, p. 8. 
110 AMFA, Code 8, 1955-64, Index no. 882, De Haas, Reyseger, Hauge and Kasa to 
Joint Commission, 22 Feb. 1958, with Enclosure: 'Agreement between IFA and RCN', 22 
Feb. 1958. 
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wanted to put into the joint projects; they were left free to tune their 
programmes to each other and to take up those elements which were 
attractive to the other party. In the execution of the joint projects full use 
could be made of the advantages which arose from working in one place 
with a single budget. This was a desire which had been cherished for a long 
time. In practice, though, the Joint Commission had in the past little 
influence upon the coordination of the programmes of the two organizations, 
but with these clearly defined joined projects it was more likely to be 
successful. 
The draft agreement was discussed in the Joint Commission on 17 
and 18 March 1958 and in the main approved. First, though, the two 
governments had to be brought into the decision-making process. Secondly, 
the committee had to incorporate some minor observations of the Joint 
Commission into the final draft which could be signed at the next meeting 
of the Joint Commission. 11 I The Committee of Four therefore met one 
more time to prepare the text of the draft agreement, taking into account the 
observations of the Joint Commission, to be put before the executive 
committees of RCN and IF A. The new draft involved a few textual changes, 
the main points remained intact. Both executive committees approved the 
agreement. 112 The Joint Commission got to work on the Committee of 
Four's final proposal in its meeting on 7 August 1958 and agreed to the text 
as it stood. The only remaining difference of opinion concerned the Dutch 
uranium, to which we shall return in the next paragraph.113 The agreement, 
signed on 27 January 1959, would come into force on I July 1959 and be 
valid for five years. Norwegian-Dutch co-operation was now operated 
through RCN and IF A, so there was no longer any place for JENER. It 
111 FOM, Minutes Joint Commission, 1955-58, Minutes of the nineteenth meeting of the 
Joint Commission, 17-18 March 1958, p. 9. 
112 AMFA, Code 8, 1955-64, Index no. 882 and FOM, Records Beekman, WAR, 
Reactor I (tot 1960), Overeenkomst IFA-RCN, Reyseger to the Joint Commission, as well 
as to Kramer and Riemens, No. 152, 17 July 1958; AMFA, Code 8,1955-64, Index no. 880, 
Memorandum from Riemens to Luns, No. 1504, 14 Aug. 1958, with Enclosure: 'De 
Nederlands-Noorse sarnenwerking op atoomgebied', undated; AMFA, Oslo Embassy, 1955-
64,8\3.33, Box 35, Kemenergie. Samenwerking Nederland-Noorwegen, \957-6\, Note by 
Riemens: 'De Nederlands-Noorse sarnenwerking op atoomgebied', 23 Sept. \958. 
11J FOM, Minutes Joint Commission, \955-58, Minutes of the twentieth meeting of the 
Joint Commission, 7 Aug. \ 958, p. 2. 
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meant that JEN 
final Annual ER ceased to exist on 30 June 1959.114 In the eighth and 
JENER was Report (July 1958-June 1959) of JENER the disbandment of 
announced lIS 
FolloWi ... 
concrete detail ng the slgrung of the agreement further talks were held on the 
was propos d s of the joint projects to be undertaken by RCN and IF A. It 
where RCNe h to begin with four projects at Kjeller and three at Petten, 
associate fa ·l·a~ begun construction of the American research reactor and 
to 3 respec~1 l~les. These projects were given the numbers K-l to 4 and P-l 
crowns to b~v~.y: Expenditure was budgeted at almost 400,000 Norwegian 
happy with th IVld~d on a fifty-fifty basis. The Dutch were not completely 
Petten but had ese l~eas. They proposed the expansion of the projects in 
was agreed th to give further consideration to the division of the costs. It 
in the next J ~t RCN should come up with counter-proposals to be discussed 
paper assurn ~nt Commission meeting.116 However, also the resulting new 
increased th e that operating costs would be shared on a fifty-fifty basis, but 
three to fiv e I ~urnber of K-projects from four to six and of P-projects from 
e. 
The new . 1959. In the a~eement between RCN and IFA came mto force on I July 
and budget meantime agreements had been drawn up on the prograrrunes 
winding up S ~f the (K and P) projects. The next step was the fmancial 
rights to th 0 JE~R where arrangements had to be made concerning the 
e ur8Uiurn and plutonium in JEEP. 
114 AMFA 
van Voshol '3 ~e 8, 1955-64, Index no. 882, Gerbrandy to Baron van Aerssen Beijeren 
Atomenergi (IFA) arch 1959, with Enclosure: 'Agreement between the Institutt for 
FOM, Records Band the Foundation Reactor Centrum Nederland (RCN)', 27 Jan. 1959; 
Belastingzalen M. eekman, WAR, JENER (tot 1960), Joint Commission-I, Folder: 
1959, pp. 1-2.' Inutes of the twenty-first meeting of the Joint Commission, 27-28 Jan. 
lIS ECN E~ . 
Joint Establish~ th Annual Report, July 1958-June 1959 of the Netherlands-Norwegian 
116 F ent for Nuclear Energy Research, June 1959, pp. 6-7. 
Belasting~~ ~~rds Beekman, WAR, JENER (tot 1960), Joint Commission-I, FOlder: 
1959, pp. 3-4.' Inutes of the twenty-first meeting of the Joint Commission, 27·28 Jan. 
117 Ib.d I ., Minut pp. 3-4. es of the twenty-second meeting of the Joint Commission, 28 May 1959, 
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The disposal of Dut(:h uranium in JENER 
In view of the fact that the Norwegian-Dutch co-operation on nuclear energy 
changed as a result of the new agreement between RCN and IF A, it was 
necessary to establish who owned what under the new arrangements. A 
thorny issue involved the five tons of uranium raw material supplied by the 
Netherlands in 1951, that had been put into JEEP in the form of (British) 
uranium metal. The agreement between FOM and NTNF of 195 I granted 
FOM the right 'to obtain uranium oxide from Norway', if it were to be 
produced there, up to the same quantity as FOM was supplying to JEEP. The 
contract between RCN and IFA of November 1955 had confirmed that 'three 
tons of uranium metal provided by FOM for the Kjeller reactor will remain 
Netherlands' property and RCN may, subject to six months' notice, request 
IF A to furnish RCN with an equivalent amount of uranium'. 
The Norwegians noted that they had built JEEP, in which plutonium 
was produced, and that they had provided funds to reprocess the uranium 
and separate the plutonium. Given that the Netherlands had only contributed 
half toward this, the Norwegians standpoint was that the Netherlands was 
entitled to no more than half of the recovered uranium and plutonium. The 
amount of the latter involved a total of four hundred grams with a market 
value of fifty guilders per gram, amounting to 20,000 guilders. The 
possession of plutoni1J!l1 was more important than its market value, however, 
because it was very hard to get. 
Given the technical nature of the matter De Boer, with his back-
ground in industrial chemistry, was asked to report on the extent to which 
the plutonium could be claimed by RCN. De Boer's view was that the 
Netherlands retained the right at all times to three tons of uranium metal. If 
the Netherlands was happy to take the reprocessed material instead, this 
would include plutonium. Norway could opt to supply three tons of new 
metal uranium, in which case the Netherlands would lose all rights to the 
plutonium. De Boer therefore suggested 'making the best of a bad job and 
making do with half of the Pu (which had been produced jointly by the 
Netherlands and Norway ... )'. Since the uranium still was the property of the 
Dutch government this could not of course happen without that government's 
consent. Beekman, who had been involved in the whole history of the 
matter, that the Netherlands should claim three tons of virgin uranium raw 
material. The irradiated uranium would then become the property of the 
Norwegians. On the grounds that RCN and IF A had jointly funded the 
reprocessing and separation costs, RCN would be entitled to half of the 
.39 
plutonium. There were three possible interpretations of the uranium section 
therefore. Firstly, that the Dutch could ask for three tons of uranium metal 
back whereby the irradiated uranium would become Norwegian property. 
Because RCN and IF A had jointly funded the cost of reprocessing and 
separation, RCN would also be entitled to half of the plutonium (Beekman's 
view). Secondly, there was the view that the Netherlands retained the right 
to three tons ofunirradiated metallic uranium. Norway could always supply 
the Netherlands with this, but then the Netherlands would lose all rights over 
the plutonium. Given the importance of plutonium, the Netherlands should 
therefore be content to take half of it (De Boer's view). Thirdly, there was 
the Norwegian interpretation: the impoverished uranium in solution and the 
other byproducts after the extraction of plutonium, were the property of the 
Dutch. Half of the plutonium produced belonged to Norway because its 
production had been a joint effort. The Norwegians did not put a price on 
the other end products. The expense incurred for the waste problem would 
be met by the Norwegians (the Norwegian proposal). Although Beekman's 
standpoint was just and clear, Reyseger, the responsible director of RCN -
with a view to future co-operation with IF A - advised the government not 
to take too tough a stance and to agree with the Norwegian proposal, even 
though it meant foregoing some Dutch rights. 118 
Section 11, subsection 3 of the 1955 JENER agreement stated that a 
separate agreement would be drawn up to settle matters relating to the 
uranium, heavy water, eqnipment and other possessions when JENER was 
disbanded. A draft agreement was drawn up by RCN which went along with 
the Norwegian proposal almost in full. The Dutch uranium, which was in the 
form of uranium metal in the nuclear fuel elements in Kjeller and which had 
been irradiated, was to be made available to the reprocessing plant to be run 
and financed jointly by RCN and IF A as a joint project. The transfer of the 
uranium from the JEEP heavy water reactor would take place gradually and 
would have to be completed by 1 July 1962. The unirradiated uranium rods 
in stock in Kjeller at that time (about 75 kilograms), would be used in the 
reactor in the period up to 1 July 1962 to replace those transferred for 
reprocessing. The uranium, for as long as and in as much as it remained in 
the reactor, could be used by IFA without any fee being paid to RCN. On 
11. AMES, HOW, Folder: 54.2:51{, Splijtstofelementen; Diversen; Archives Ministry of 
General Affairs (hereafter AMGA), The Hague, Kabinet Minister-President (hereafter KMP), 
Dossier 62.093, Box 17, Samenwerking Nederland-Noorwegen, 1955-62; and AMEA, ADK, 
Index no. 313, Reyseger to Board ReN, No. 648, 23 Sept. 1959. 
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the other hand IF A must allow RCN and IF A to use the nuclear facilities of 
the reactor free of charge. The two organisations would each own half of the 
end products of reprocessing the uranium, thus including the plutonium. The 
remaining - slightly impoverished - uranium would stay the property of the 
Dutch state. IF A would be responsible for disposing of the radioactive waste 
resulting from reprocessing. For this arrangement to be accepted it was 
necessary for the Dutch government to give its consent to two matters. 
Firstly, the right, subject to six months notice, to an equal amount of 
uranium from IFA. Secondly, half of the plutonium and other nuclear 
products resulting from the reprocessing would have to be handed over to 
IF A. RCN employed two arguments to win over the Dutch government: a 
psychological argument and a business argument. The psychological one was 
that the Netherlands would thereby indicate to the Norwegians that they 
valued their continued good working relationship. The business argument 
was that the Netherlands would obtain half of the plutonium, considered to 
be of the utmost importance for Dutch research.119 
Since the uranium raw material still belonged to the Ministry of 
Education, the Arts and Science, this ministry had to give the final consent 
for it to be relinquished. This permission followed on 21 November 1959 
and the arrangements with the Norwegians could be finalized. l •o 
The liquidation of JENER 
The arrangements for the uranium were ratified at the meeting of the Joint 
Commission on 10 June 1960. The irradiated uranium still being used in 
JEEP would gradually be transferred to the reprocessing plant at Kjeller and 
afterwards RCN and IF A would each gain possession of half of the 
radioactive products, including the plutonium. This slightly impoverished 
uranium remained the property of the Netherlands and could be claimed back 
later. Of course the liquidation of JENER did not only involve the issue of 
the uranium. Arrangements also had to be made with respect to financial 
matters, since no agreement had as yet been reached on the fmancial RCN's 
rights to the assets left after the liquidation of JENER. This was because the 
119 AMES, HOW, Folder: 54.2:5K, Splijtstofelementen; Diversen and AMEA, ADK, 
Index no. 313, Reyseger to Meylink, 9 Nov. 1959. 
120 AMES, HOW, Folder: 54.2:5K, Splijtstofelementen; Diversen and AMEA, ADK, 
Index no. 314, Piekaar to the Board of ReN, 21 Nov. 1959. 
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Norwegians could not agree to the sum of 834,000 Norwegian crowns that 
the Dutch were claiming. They were thinking in terms of 500,000 to 600,000 
Norwegian crowns. Randers appealed to the Dutch not to push for a precise 
financial settlement that threatened to spoil relations between the two 
countries. To do so would be regrettable, since the liquidation did not mean 
the end of Norwegian-Dutch co-operation. Moreover, the Norwegians were 
to contribute a sum of 500,000 to 550,000 crowns to the construction of a 
library building in Petten. This neutralised the Dutch claim. With regard to 
an RCN loan to the company which had provided housing for its staff, it 
was agreed that IFA would pay this back in instalments. JENER's balance 
on 30 June 1959 stood at over 460,000 Norwegian crowns, made up of cash 
and stock. The Dutch delegation agreed that this sum be allocated for the 
waste disposal plant that IF A was to build next to the reprocessing plant. 
Agreement had been reached on the liquidation of JENER: this form of 
Norwegian-Dutch co-operation had thus ended but it was to be continued for 
a number of years through the joint projects of RCN and IF A. 121 
Conclusions 
After the devastation of the Second World War the Netherlands and Norway 
were faced with the task of reconstructing their countries. Nuclear research 
was one of the issues that was subjected to close scrutiny in this context. 
The Netherlands quickly came to the conclusion that it would be impossible 
to build a nuclear reactor independently; to do so was not feasible either 
technically or financially. The Norwegians were of a different opinion at 
fust. In 1945-1946 they set out to build a reactor independently and it took 
years before Randers was forced to change his mind because of the 
difficulties created by the lack of uranium. In view of this the hunt was on 
for collaborative links which would, moreover, strengthen the separate 
development of nuclear research in each country. 
121 AMEA, ADK, Index no. 314, Minutes of the twenty-third meeting of the Joint 
Commission, 10 June 1960, pp. 6-10; Ibid., Agreement between RCN and IFA,2 Dec. 1960; 
AMOA, KMP, Dossier 62.093, Box 32, Buitenlandse samenwerking RCN, Kramer to Bmrd 
RCN, No. 773, 23 June 1960, with Enclosures: 'Korte samenvatting van de 23" Joint 
Commission vergadering op 10 juni 1960', undated and 'Punten waarover _en Iiquidat-
ieregeling met IF A zal worden getroffen', undated; AMFA, Code 8, 1955-"'4, fndrx no. 880, 
Memorandum from TMA to DOES, No. 1254, 16 June 1960. 
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The hunt for co-operative links was thwarted by American policy, 
which was characterised by secrecy and monopolisation in the field of the 
application of nuclear energy after the Second World War. The export of 
nuclear know-how or the strategic resources uranium and thorium was ruled 
out. The search was on then for another partner. Norway collaborated closely 
with the French throughout the late 1940's. But nuclear co-operation with 
this country was never formalized for political reasons, i.e. the American 
opposition and Joliot-Curie's 'communism'. 
During Kramer's visit to Oslo in 1950, where he met Randers among 
others, the foundation for Norwegian-Dutch co-operation was laid. On a 
reciprocal basis the Netherlands was to contribute uranium raw material and 
the Norwegians heavy water and a rea<:tor under construction in Kjeller. 
Great Britain functioned in a supportive role by being prepared to exchange 
the Dutch uranium oxide, which in its unpurified form could not be used in 
the reactor (JEEP), for rods of uranium metal. The start of operations at the 
Norwegian-Dutch reactor in Kjeller in July 1951 heralded the first phase of 
Norwegian-Dutch co-operation: JENER. 
The mid-1950's saw an important change of direction in the nuclear 
policy of the United States, launched by President Eisenhower's 'Atoms for 
Peace' proposal. The end of the American policy of secrecy and exclusion 
brought new opportunities for other countries, included prospects for export 
of nuclear know-how, enriched uranium, and even complete reactors. Dutch 
nuclear physicists were at once interested in the new opportunities. 
During the period of the first JENER contract (1951-1955), because 
of the international context, the joint project encompassed virtually 
everything that happened in the nuclear energy field in both countries. In the 
second contract period (1955-1959) further work outside the joint operations 
began. Two agreements were concluded between the Foundation RCN and 
IFA. The first was a general agreement to continue working together. Only 
an extra paragraph was inserted which allowed joint projects to be started; 
this departed from the principles of the agreement, for which a separate 
agreement would be necessary. This second agreement ensured the continued 
existence of JENER for a further three years until 30 June 1958. It was 
however the beginning of the end. 
Negotiations were conducted with the Norwegians about the building 
of BE POP (or NUPOP, a straightforward extrapolation of JEEP) or SUS POP 
(a revolutionary design, with the uraniun fuel in suspension, favoured by the 
Dutch electric utilities). There was a world of difference concealed behind 
the two reactors. The Netherlands was dependent upon dwindling production 
from the Limburg coal mines and the import of oil, and saw nuclear power 
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primarily as a solution to its energy problems. The Norwegians had plenty 
hydroelectric power of their own and were more interested in using nuclear 
power in their large merchant fleet. Consequently while the Dutch preferred 
to build SUSPOP, the Norwegians preferred BEPOP (NUPOP), which could 
conceivably be installed in a ship. Although SUSPOP was considered more 
important in the long run, the Netherlands nevertheless opted for NUPOP. 
This decision was based on practical considerations. Only by going for 
NUPOP could the Netherlands get hold of the necessary raw materials. 
Furthermore the Netherlands did not want to place their successful 
relationship with the Norwegians in the balance. By co-operating with the 
Norwegians and using the heavy water reactor in Kje1\er (JEEP), the 
Netherlands had leapt ahead in the field of nuclear research compared to 
other countries (apart from the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet 
Union). So NUPOP was, for the Dutch, first and foremost an intermediate 
step en route to SUSPOP, for which also the lack of enriched uranium 
formed a stumbling block. 
The 'Atoms for Peace'speech by the American President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower in December 1953 heralded an important change in the 
American policy of secrecy and opened up the possibility of purchasing 
enriched uranium and so starting work on SUSPOP straight away. 
In the end the Netherlands chose to purchase a research reactor based 
on American technology and JENER was more or less written off. Both 
agreements were extended for another year in 1958, but after that Norwe-
gian-Dutch nuclear co-operation through JENER was rea1\y brought to an 
end. Co-operation between RCN and IF A continued though. Agreements 
were made to conduct joint projects, to be carried out by mixed Norwegian-
Dutch teams, either in Petten or in Kjeller. They were given the names 
P(etten)-project 1 to 5 and KGeller)-project 1 to 6. After the material assets 
and the fmances had been wound up, a decade of Norwegian-Dutch joint 
operations through JENER had come to an end. It had been a very successful 
collaboration. By co-operating we1\ and throwing chauvinism overboard, two 
sma1\ countries had managed to build a nuclear reactor and use it for 
research and the production of radioisotopes. Thus they were among the first 
West European countries to do so. That can be ca1\ed an achievement. 
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